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1 Introduction
When news of the financial crisis of 2008 began to
break, a group of Research Fellows at IDS
mobilised to consider the possible consequences
for developing countries. Their deliberations were
based on a limited amount of information about
the ways that the crisis was unfolding globally; on
experience of previous similar crises and on
theoretical analyses of how such shocks might play
out in developing countries. This resulted in a
collection of articles published as an IDS Bulletin
entitled ‘Policy Responses to the Global Financial
Crisis’ in January 2009 (Sumner and McCulloch
2009). It was apparent as these discussions
proceeded, that there was an absence of real
empirical insight into what was happening in
different developing countries and how those
impacts were affecting poor people in particular.
Around this time, a number of IDS researchers,
alongside colleagues from the Overseas
Development Institute (ODI) and in partnership
with developing country partners, were
commissioned to carry out grassroots qualitative
and quantitative studies of the impacts of the crisis
(see Hossain et al. 2010; McCulloch and Grover
2010; ODI 2009, 2010). This was one of a range of
initiatives that were being launched at that time
by a variety of agencies and organisations to carry
out detailed monitoring of the ways that the
financial crisis was impacting. In order to generate
greater value from these diverse studies, IDS also
established an initiative called ‘Crisis Watch’.
Crisis Watch was established to coordinate the
findings from these various efforts and highlight
how they were impacting on human lives. It was
anticipated that in addition to the immediate
effects of the financial crisis being felt in
developing countries at that time, the
consequences of the financial crisis would continue
to be experienced in waves of secondary impacts
over the coming months and years. Crisis Watch
formed a network of policy thinkers, academics
and activists who were involved in monitoring and
acting on the ongoing effects of the 2008 crisis, to
share knowledge on frameworks for understanding
crisis; methodologies for quickly generating
evidence on human impacts and methodologies for
designing and implementing policy.1
Crisis Watch provided a space within which to
discuss and explore the ways in which the crisis
was affecting thinking about how we do
development and how we might cope with a more
volatile and shock-prone future. This article
summarises some of the major kinds of
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complexity thinking. This focus on relationships between people represents a significantly different starting
point for development policy thinking.
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2 A chronology of crisis watching
Before we go on to discuss the reimaginings, it is
first helpful to consider the chronology of the
crisis and the responses of Crisis Watch partners
to it. A number of major development
organisations were quick off the mark in their
efforts to understand the impacts of the financial
crisis. For example, the World Bank launched a
series of participatory qualitative studies in 15
countries, which were designed to produce rapid
information to complement ongoing quantitative
work that was already under way (Turk 2009). A
number of international NGOs embarked on
studies, one being Oxfam who collected insights
from 2,500 individuals in 11 case study countries
using a variety of methodological approaches
(Green et al. 2010). The IDS studies involved
using a range of participatory and qualitative
research methods in six countries (Hossain et al.
2010). WIEGO (Women in Informal
Employment: Globalizing and Organizing)
undertook a series of studies focusing
particularly on the impacts on women (Horn
2009, 2011). At the same time, a wide range of
UN bodies were gathering diverse forms of
information on the impacts in particular
countries and across particular sectors (Mendoza
2010; WTO/ILO 2009; UNRISD 2009).2
An important landmark in the UN response to
the crisis was the establishment of UN GIVAS
(Global Impact and Vulnerability Alert System)
in July 2009. This initiative was launched by the
Secretary General as a major UN response in the
wake of the crisis and to establish a body that
would convene a global decision support network
to provide policymakers with evidence and
insight quickly in order for them to take rapid
and effective action to protect the vulnerable in
response to emerging crises. This initiative was
novel because it sought to harness the power of
emerging information and communications
technologies (ICTs). The new organisation,
which was subsequently renamed UN Global
Pulse, also had a key role in coordinating the
information gathered by a range of institutional
partners in the UN family, including UNICEF,
UNDP, WHO, WFP, UNFPA, OCHA, as well as
the World Bank (see also Hossain, this IDS
Bulletin). Drawing on a wide range of material,
including that produced by organisations
involved in the Crisis Watch network and from a
wide range of UN sources, Global Pulse produced
their second Voices of the Vulnerable report in 2010
on the human impacts of the crisis (UN Global
Pulse 2010). Representatives from Global Pulse
and most of the aforementioned organisations
took part in the Crisis Watch Workshop at IDS in
March 2010, which acted as a forum to stimulate
much of this reimagining.
Strangely, however, by mid-2010 there were signs
that the steam was beginning to run out of the
interest in the crisis in some of the major
development organisations. An emergent
narrative was building which said that the
impacts on developing countries were not as bad
as we might have feared and indeed some
economies were showing signs of recovery (World
Bank 2010). These interpretations increasingly
referred to surprising amounts of ‘resilience’. As
will be argued later in this article, the
widespread use of the term ‘resilience’ can be
interpreted as deflecting some of the pressure to
reimagine fundamental aspects of development
thinking that the financial crisis initially
provoked, but it also represents a possible route
to some fundamental reimagining.
3 What we learned about the crisis itself
Despite this increasingly positive narrative, as the
monitoring work of the different organisations got
under way, it became apparent that there had
been a major global human crisis. Despite the
early speculation that some developing countries
would not be affected because of their weak
integration into the global economy, the studies
revealed negative human impacts in most
developing (and developed) countries and across a
range of different sectors, including those that
seemed weakly connected to the global economy.
It was also realised that for many people it was a
compound crisis in which the effects of the
financial crisis were interacting with the ongoing
crises generated by high food and fuel prices. In
some cases, it was further compounded by other
more ‘local’ crises, including ongoing political and
environmental instabilities.
From the qualitative studies that were conducted
by organisations involved in the Crisis Watch
network during the first year of the crisis, there
are two particular kinds of responses that
command attention in the context of this
reimagining. The first was where poor people
effectively retorted, ‘which crisis are you
referring to?’ Their experience is a life which
was in chronic crisis and where they found it
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difficult to discern any worsening of their
situation as a result of a global financial turmoil.
While these responses may or not have been
accurate (it is possible that aspects of the
‘Triple F’ crisis had in fact worsened their
plight), they nevertheless highlight that for
many people in developing countries, the state of
‘crisis’ is their everyday condition. It is more a
consequence of their structural position in
particular societies and then in the global order,
than it is a result of any one global or local event.
The second form of response was from those who
held the view that this crisis had not had any
particular impact on their country. It was
heralded that this was a crisis for the North and
for the developed world but not for developing
countries. This finding was found in a number of
the Crisis Watch studies and is echoed in other
articles in this IDS Bulletin (Shankland for
Brazil; Mehta for India; Habermann for
Ethiopia). This type of response appears to have
been driven by two possibilities: that the
respondents genuinely had seen no evidence of
any impact, or that it was an ideological position
which was a bravura assertion of autonomy and
increased independence from the developed
world. In most cases, it was likely a combination
of the two. Although the assertion of ‘no impact’,
was understandable in economies that were
particularly vibrant and growing, research by
Crisis Watch participant organisations in those
countries often revealed some impacts, but these
were restricted to some sections of the
populations, in some parts of the country (e.g.
Times of India, February 2010). The Crisis Watch
studies revealed that the global crisis tended to
impact on particular and already vulnerable
groups. Migrant workers and young people bore
the brunt of formal job losses and the elderly and
children suffered from knock-on effects on
household budgets and coping systems. This had
further effects in terms of increasing tensions in
communities and additional burdens being
placed on informal sector income earning.
Families coped with reduced incomes by
reducing the quantity and or quality of food
consumed. Overall, various reports suggest that
the burden of coping with the effects of the crises
fell particularly on women in their social
reproduction roles of caring for and raising
children and ensuring the family was fed
adequately (Oxfam 2009). In many locations,
this additional burden was reported as having
placed great strain on relations with others both
within the family and the community. These
kinds of impacts which exacerbate
marginalisation and polarisation in societies,
which destroy aspirations and feed disaffection,
and which increase stress and have negative
impacts on the relationships that are
fundamental to human wellbeing, are not usually
captured by the economic data that tell us that
the impacts of the global crisis were not as bad
as we might have feared.
So what do these two types of responses tell us
about reimagining development in times of
crisis? The first reminds us of what social
psychologists have called the ‘focusing illusion’,
which is where external observers see a problem
but where for those involved, it is just normal
life. In such circumstances, the possibilities of a
global crisis stimulating an opportunity to
reimagine among those being impacted are
limited, because from their perspective ‘crisis’ is
a chronic condition. The second set of comments
indicates that some people are so far removed
from the human impacts of crisis that they are
prepared to deny that it has had an effect at all
and thus it provides no stimulus for reimagining.
This has wider implications, since the failure to
communicate information about crisis impacts
either within nation-states or globally or even
the obfuscation of information about the human
impacts of a major global crisis, reduces the
pressure nationally and globally for reimagining.
These processes allude to the politics and power
that are in play in the production and
dissemination of evidence about crisis impacts.
4 What we learned about the methodologies for
understanding the human impacts of crises
While there are masses of data generated on
many aspects of the condition of developing
countries, very little of it is produced quickly. In a
contribution to the debate on the financial crisis
in the New York Times, Paul Krugman reminded us
that Keynes once sagely observed at the time of
the Great Depression that, ‘In the long run we
are all dead’. To modify this provocatively and
inelegantly, regarding crises, by the time the
quantitative data is produced to confirm what the
impacts of the particular crisis have been, some
people might be dead. A specific purpose for the
organisations involved in the Crisis Watch
network was to be timely in the generation of
data on the impacts on people located in different
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places in the global economy. The monitoring
tools and systems that were developed by the
network organisations prioritised the quick
production of data that would be accessible for
policymakers and decision-makers. The
methodologies employed were designed with this
as a foremost consideration and as such, involved
trade-offs between rapid delivery for policy
relevance and scientific rigour.
The work of Crisis Watch network organisations
has shown that it is possible to generate data
quickly that effectively identifies emerging
trends and generates detailed insights into the
complex processes around crisis impacts. But
getting this data taken seriously is another
matter. Generating this kind of data quickly
involves compromises in respect of key social
science methodological considerations. There are
serious challenges in both the representativeness
and replicability of such studies. Usually, both of
these problems for social science studies are
dealt with by sampling strategies which are
statistically defensible. However, the type of
studies that were required here and the scale of
funding for them, did not permit sampling on
the scale that would be required to construct a
statistical defence of the data. The purposive,
opportunistic and small-scale nature of the
studies provide a route to undermine the
credibility of the findings. As members of the
network discussed during the Crisis Watch
workshop, the sampling bias problem is captured
in the simple allegation that ‘if you go looking
for problems, then you will find them’.
We know that there were winners in the financial
crisis but the purpose of the Crisis Watch
organisations was not to explore who was winning
but to find those who were losing and how this
was manifesting itself. Moreover, the findings
have been remarkably consistent across the
different studies and where statistical rigour has
not been possible, the careful triangulation of
results from different methods generates a form
of affirmation for the findings. The studies
systematically brought the voices, views and
experiences of those affected by the crisis events
into the policy discussion. They also affirmed
more casual observations from development
professionals in a wide range of country locations,
that the impacts were significant but were
different for different groups in society. So, while
the data that was generated did not pretend to
have statistical validity, it did have ‘face validity’:
i.e. regardless of whether it was amenable
statistical testing or not, for many people it
offered insights that rang true with their
observations of reality (UN Global Pulse 2010).
Reflecting on the Crisis Watch methodology,
discussions suggest that there is a need for
reimagining around issues of data, methods and
evidence for effective and timely development
policy responses. Development policymakers face
the question as to what it is they regard as
constituting ‘evidence’ and must confront the
conundrum of requiring fast and insightful
information about emergent events for smart
policy responses and then express concern over
the validity of the findings. The alternative is to
wait for what is regarded to be statistically valid
data to emerge from standard, ‘rigorous’ and
usually quantitatively dominated research
processes. In the case of the global financial
crisis of 2008, some years later we are still
waiting for an abundance of such data and the
lives of people who have been affected move on
and the moment for effective policy responses
may have passed. At a broader level, a subtle
process of the discounting of qualitative data by
more quantitative-oriented agencies and
analysts, in favour of what the hard, quantitative,
macrodata could tell us, has served to gradually
erode the overall sense of urgency for a broader
reimagining of development.
5 What has the Crisis Watch taught us about
what might need reimagining in the
development model?
To conclude this discussion, we can focus on two
concepts that came to the fore in discussions
during the Crisis Watch process. These highlight
two kinds of reimagining development that
might be required. The two concepts are:
‘attribution’ and ‘resilience’.
The question repeatedly posed during Crisis
Watch discussions was: ‘What impacts can we
specifically attribute to the global financial
crisis?’ This was regarded as important for policy
thinking, since if a specific channel or set of
channels for adverse impacts could be identified,
then it might be possible to argue for and design
specific policy instruments to protect poor and
vulnerable people against these. However, the
Crisis Watch studies have tended to report that
households and individuals in developing
McGregor Reimagining Development through the Crisis Watch Initiative20
countries experienced the effects of the financial
crisis as an element of a complex crisis, where
combinations of effects from different crisis
dynamics interacted in particular social and
economic contexts to produce specific adverse
outcomes.
Mayoux and Chambers (2005) point out that
attributing impacts involves simplifying
assumptions about complex and hidden chains of
multiple causality and assumptions about
directions of causation. While the untangling of
complex ‘webs of causation’ is standard business
for macro-level and more highly aggregated
forms of study, the translation of this logic to
human-level assessment is more problematic.
Differentiated impacts, differentiated capacities
to cope and differentiated responses are all
significant when thinking about real world policy
options and design.
When examining the impacts of the global
financial crisis from the perspective of those that
we see as being affected, a linear notion of
attribution looks less credible. A critical appraisal
of the notion of attribution in the context of
complex crises suggests that one aspect of
reimagining development in a more crisis-prone
and unpredictable world is to embrace the notion
of complexity. When exploring the possible
contribution of complexity thinking to
development, Ramalingam et al. (2008) argue
that the nature of human systems includes
feedback processes between interconnected
elements and dimensions, which lead to dynamic,
non-linear and unpredictable change. As such,
the relationships between the global financial
crisis and household vulnerabilities cannot easily
be dissected. It does not make good policy sense
to seek to simplistically assign impacts to neat
policy categories, which can then be dealt with by
discrete policy instruments. Rather, a systems
approach is required, in which the system that is
generating poverty and vulnerability outcomes is
a coherent entity that comprises multiple and
complex interrelationships between elements of
the systems in which the individuals and
households are involved.
However, some elements of ‘complexity thinking’
have begun to seep into development thinking and
this has been accelerated by the rise to
prominence of the notion of ‘resilience’ in the
financial crisis literature. ‘Resilience’ is a term
which has deep roots in complexity thinking and in
this context, can be understood as the idea that
people, organisations (like businesses) and societal
institutions have the flexibility and resources to
enable them to cope with shocks and changes to
their working environment and can adapt in ways
that do not permanently damage them.
But there are mismatches and problems in the
way that the term resilience has been used in the
literature on the financial crisis. In particular,
some reports that heralded the resilience of
certain national economies focused on
macroeconomic indicators (IMF 2010), while the
various Crisis Watch reports indicate profound
damage to some members of those societies.
Taking a systems perspective, it is apparent that
what is called the resilience of the national
economic system has come at the cost of the
resilience of other parts of the system. For
example, the loss of formal employment and the
deterioration of formal employment conditions
have been characteristics of recent crisis impacts,
but the flexible labour laws that have enabled
such changes have been important in maintaining
economic system resilience. In this crisis period in
South-east Asia (compared with the crisis of 1997,
for example) fewer businesses have gone bust,
thus retaining, for the economic system, the
ability to generate future profits, incomes and
provide jobs. This level of resilience, however, has
been achieved at the cost of those who have been
laid off, work part time or have had their real
incomes cut. In this case, economic system
resilience has not been without its human costs.
The use of the term ‘resilience’ when referring
only to indicators of macroeconomic performance,
highlights the fact that conventional
macroeconomic measures presently miss much of
the informal economy and all of the unpaid work
that makes up household ‘resilience’. It does not
reflect the many gender- and age-differentiated
impacts and much of the lasting social damage to
people’s wellbeing and societies. Findings from
Crisis Watch studies on the ground suggest that
the resilience of national economies, praised by
many observers, is fuelled in large part by the
coping strategies of households, and that this
coping did not come without a cost. In other
words, it does not describe system resilience.
As such, there is a danger that the term
‘resilience’ has been used in a superficial and
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misleading way. It currently may serve to hide
more than it reveals and if its use remains
superficial, then it is at risk of becoming merely
another development fad that commands
attention and resources fleetingly but is never
deepened in ways that might require changes in
how we think about and do development.
The alternative is to take a more relational
understanding of resilience, grounded in the
complexity theory. This must be understood
primarily in terms of human outcomes and be
analysed in terms of the ability of people and
communities to withstand and recover from
stresses, such as environmental change or social,
economic or political upheaval. A resilient
society is one that protects its people; that has
the capacity to withstand shocks and surprises
and, if damaged, is able to rebuild itself, relying
on the underpinning psychological foundations of
and interlinkages within the system.
The big leap of development imagination
required by this approach is to conceive of
societies and economies in terms of the human
relationships that comprise them. The turn to a
conception of development that focuses on
relationships between people provides an
alternative starting point for thinking about
development policy (McGregor and Sumner
2010). In particular, it moves us beyond thinking
about resilience only in terms of building
individual or household wealth and capitals and
it indicates that we must understand resilience
as being an outcome of relationships between
individuals and households, in particular social
and cultural contexts and under specific political
economy conditions. This suggests that efforts by
policy to build resilience cannot rely on analysis
that focuses only on some dimensions of the
system (e.g. economic), rather it must focus on
promoting both human wellbeing and the
societal institutions that enable us to live well
together (Deneulin and McGregor 2010). To do
this requires coordinated work across dimensions
and at different levels of human social systems,
from the individual, to households, up to the
levels of nation-state and global order.
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Notes
1 Crisis Watch was funded first by IDS internal
funds, through the Reimagining Development
initiative and was supported by the voluntary
contributions of various IDS staff. It received
additional funding from the UK Department
for International Development (DFID),
primarily to hold a workshop, which brought
together the various major organisations to
reflect on their findings, methodology and on
what the crisis was telling us.
2 For a description of the methodologies
employed in the different studies, see the
reports cited here and in the Crisis Watch
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